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CAUSATION: AN EPIDEMIOLOGIC 
PERSPECTIVE (IN FIVE PARTS) 
Douglas L. Weed, M.D., Ph.D.* 
I.  THERE ARE TWO SIDES TO EVERY QUESTION—PROTAGORAS 
How much scientific evidence does it take to claim causation? 
What kinds and characteristics of evidence are needed to claim that 
an exposure causes a disease? 
Epidemiology appears to be uniquely positioned to answer 
these questions. Causation, after all, is an integral part of this key 
public health discipline. As the first half of a common definition 
states: “Epidemiology is the study of the distributions and (causal) 
determinants of disease in populations.”1 
Epidemiology’s search for disease causation has been a long 
one. For nearly two centuries, we have examined why populations 
suffer from cholera and tuberculosis, pellagra and scurvy, heart 
disease and cancer, dementia, suicide, and AIDS, to name a few 
examples. Significant progress has been made in our understanding 
of why populations get sick and how their health can and has been 
improved.2 Indeed, the main reason epidemiologists study 
                                                          
 * Douglas L. Weed, M.D., Ph.D., is Dean, Education and Training, and 
Chief, Office of Preventive Oncology, and Director, Cancer Prevention 
Fellowship Program, Division of Cancer Prevention, National Cancer Institute, 
Rockville, Maryland. 
1 DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 62 (John M. Last ed., 4th ed. 2001). 
2 ROBERT BEAGLEHOLE & RUTH BONITA, PUBLIC HEALTH AT THE 
CROSSROADS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 13-43 (1997); CHRONIC DISEASE 
EPIDEMIOLOGY AND CONTROL 1-26 (Ross C. Brownson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998); 
COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1-18 (1988); JOHN DUFFY, THE 
SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH (1992). 
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causation is to use scientific knowledge to control disease (and 
injuries) through preventive interventions. As the full definition in 
the Dictionary of Epidemiology states, “Epidemiology is the study 
of the distributions and (causal) determinants of disease in 
populations and the application of this study to control health 
problems.”3 Identify causes, remove them from the environment, 
and prevent disease: this is the time-honored central mission of 
epidemiology and all other public health disciplines. 
What epidemiologists do not do is study disease causation in 
order to assign responsibility for harm caused to individuals; 
specific causation is not a traditional problem for epidemiologists.4 
For judges, legal scholars, and others involved in toxic tort 
litigation, however, the problem of specific causation is 
paramount. Binding together these two views—one from the world 
of epidemiology, the other from the law—is that both require an 
answer to the problem of general causation. Put another way, there 
are two sides to the questions of causation posed above, two very 
different reasons for answering the same question: one for public 
health decisions, the other for legal decisions. 
My purpose in this paper is to describe how epidemiologists 
make claims about general causation, how they practice causal 
                                                          
3 DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, supra note 1, at 62 (emphasis added). 
Definitions of epidemiology have undergone significant transformation in the 
past thirty years. In the 1970s and 1980s, epidemiology was often defined 
strictly as a science without reference to the public health application of the 
knowledge gained by scientific study; in the 1990s, definitions of epidemiology 
have emphasized the dual role of professional practitioners in scientific 
investigation and in public health interventions. DOUGLAS L. WEED, 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND ETHICS IN EPIDEMIOLOGY, in ETHICS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY 
76-94 (Steven S. Coughlin & Tom L. Beauchamp eds., 1996); Douglas L. Weed 
& Robert E. McKeown, Science and Social Responsibility in Public Health, 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP., 1804, 1805 (2003); Douglas L. Weed & Pamela J. 
Mink, Roles and Responsibilities of Epidemiologists, ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 
67, 68 (2002). 
4 LEON GORDIS, EPIDEMIOLOGY 286-87 (2000); Michael D. Green, D. 
Mical Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333 (2d ed. 
2000), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman00.pdf/ 
$file/sciman00.pdf. 
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inference. I will identify some important problems that exist in that 
practice, and what the future holds for solving them. 
II.  HABIT IS THE ENORMOUS FLYWHEEL OF SOCIETY—WILLIAM 
JAMES 
What follows is a brief description of the practice of causal 
inference in epidemiology, with the following simplifying 
assumptions: 
1. Scientific evidence to be assessed has been made available 
through a systematic literature review. 
2. A statistical association between the exposure (the purported 
cause) and the disease (the purported effect) has been established 
at a level of significance of p < 0.05. 
3. All epidemiologic studies examined have measured all 
known confounders (an unreasonable assumption in many 
situations, but helpful for the purposes of this brief discussion). 
4. Evidence from a randomized prevention trial is not available 
for the exposure-disease association under scrutiny. 
5. A quantitative meta-analysis could be carried out, but will 
not be. 
This situation well approximates what Austin Bradford Hill—
of Hill’s causal criteria fame—faced in his now-classic paper on 
causal inference,5 published one year after the 1964 Surgeon 
General’s Report on Smoking and Cancer, another key paper on 
causal inference as it has been conceptualized and practiced in 
epidemiology.6 
From a systematic literature review, different types of scientific 
evidence would emerge, including but not limited to laboratory-
based “biological” studies, as well as several types of 
epidemiologic studies, e.g., case-control and cohort. 
Epidemiologists typically consider the potential biases in the 
                                                          
5 Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or 
Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295, 295-300 (1965). 
6 SURGEON GENERAL’S ADVISORY COMM. ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH 
(1964) [hereinafter 1964 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT]. 
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results of such studies as well as the potential role of unknown 
confounders.7 If we can assume, however, for the sake of brevity in 
this description, that bias is not likely to be responsible for the 
results of these studies, then the practitioner of causal inference 
moves to the next step in the process: the examination of the 
summarized evidence in terms of Hill’s causal criteria. Excluding 
“experimentation” (see assumption number 4 above), there are 
eight such considerations:8 
1. Consistency 
2. Strength of association 
3. Dose response (or biological gradient) 
4. Biological plausibility 
5. Coherence 
6. Temporality 
7. Specificity 
8. Analogy 
These so-called causal criteria—of which only “temporality” is 
the only true criterion—are then “applied to” or “considered in the 
light of” the evidence. 
The first decision to be made by the user is the selection of the 
                                                          
7 Jennifer L. Kelsey, Diana B. Petitti & Abby C. King, Key Methodologic 
Concepts and Issues, in APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY 35 (Ross C. Brownson & Diana 
B. Pettiti eds., 1998); Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander Greenland, Precision and 
Validity in Epidemiologic Studies, in  MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 115-134 (2d ed. 
1998). 
8 These so-called “Hill’s criteria” emerged from a conversation in the 
medical and public health literature that can be traced back at least as far as the 
early nineteenth century in the works of Jakob Henle and Robert Koch, both of 
whom discussed the nature of causation in terms of infectious diseases. See 
Alfred S. Evans, Causation and Disease: a Chronological Journey, 108 AM. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY, 249, 249-58 (1978); ALFRED S. EVANS, CAUSATION AND 
DISEASE (1993). The extension of this discussion to the causation of chronic 
diseases—cancer, heart disease, mental illness, and diabetes, to name a few 
examples—began around 1950 and continues through today. The practice of 
causal inference, however, remains firmly rooted in the criteria proposed by 
Austin Bradford Hill in 1965. DOUGLAS L. WEED, Causal and Preventive 
Inference, in CANCER PREVENTION AND CONTROL 285 (Peter Greenwald, 
Barnett S. Kramer & Douglas L. Weed eds., 1995); Douglas L. Weed & Lester 
S. Gorelic, The Practice of Causal Inference in Cancer Epidemiology, 5 
CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 303, 303-311 (1996). 
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criteria. In cancer epidemiology, for example, the most likely 
choice involves: consistency, strength, dose-response, and 
biological plausibility, leaving behind coherence, specificity, 
analogy, and (interestingly) temporality. In each individual 
application, the user will select those he believes to be most 
relevant. 
After some written narrative discussion, typically a paragraph 
or two for each of the criteria selected, the user of this method then 
makes a claim about the extent to which the exposure and the 
disease under question are causally related. Sometimes 
recommendations regarding preventive interventions are also 
included. 
This is a bare-bones—but reasonably accurate—account of the 
epidemiologic approach to causal inference. This is our habit, our 
way of solving a very important professional problem. 
III.  ONLY THE WEARER KNOWS WHERE THE SHOE PINCHES—OLD 
ENGLISH PROVERB 
This description of the use of causal criteria could have 
included the following, more complete, set of steps: 
1. Selection of the Criteria (as mentioned above) 
2. Prioritization of the Criteria Selected 
3. Assigning a Rule of Inference to each Criterion 
Studies of the practice of causal inference have shown that 
epidemiologists rarely pay attention to the second and third steps 
above.9 It is unfortunate but true that a practitioner can undertake 
this practice precisely as described above10 without mentioning to 
those who review, edit, and eventually read the causal assessment 
                                                          
9 See Weed & Gorelic, supra note 8, at 303-11; Douglas L. Weed & 
Stephen D. Hursting, Biologic Plausibility in Causal Inference: Current Method 
and Practice, 147 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 415 (1998); Douglas L. Weed, 
Epidemiologic Evidence and Causal Inference, 14 HEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY 
CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 797 (2000); Douglas L. Weed, Methods in 
Epidemiology and Public Health: Does Practice Match Theory?, 55 J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 104 (2001) [hereinafter Weed, Methods 
in Epidemiology]. 
10 See supra Part II. 
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in the peer-reviewed scientific literature, how these criteria are 
being prioritized (other than some are included and others are not). 
Similarly, it is exceedingly unusual for a practitioner to describe 
the rules of inference assigned to each criterion prior to their 
application. By “rules of inference” I mean the conditions under 
which one will accept or not accept the criterion as having been 
satisfied, or more likely satisfied. If, for example, the user of the 
method believes that causation is extremely unlikely if the 
summarized risk estimate—the relative risk estimate across the 
studies collected—is less than 2.0, then a reasonable rule of 
inference for that criterion, for that user, in that particular 
circumstance, would be that “relative risk estimates less than 2.0 
will be considered unlikely causal” or something along those lines. 
The rules of inference used for the criterion of biological 
plausibility are especially mysterious. Other criteria can be 
similarly described. 
In sum, the current user of causal inference methods in 
epidemiology can select the criteria they wish, prioritize them in 
any manner they wish, and assign rules of inferences to them 
(implicitly) without ever mentioning them. While it is possible to 
infer these various choices by careful reading, they need not be 
stated anywhere in the paper. 
It is also true—and at least as unfortunate—that in many 
scientific journals, these sorts of causal assessments can occur 
without a systematic review of the literature. The studies selected 
for review may not, in these circumstances, represent those culled 
from a larger set using stated inclusion and exclusion criteria.11 
Add to this ever-accumulating pile of subjective features the 
uncertainties stemming from loosening the overly simplistic 
assumptions regarding statistical significance, confounding, and 
bias, along with the potential (and documented) role of personal, 
social, moral, and political values in decision making, and it is fair 
                                                          
11 Douglas L. Weed, On the Use of Causal Criteria, 26 INT’L J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1137 (1997); Douglas L. Weed, Methodologic Guidelines for 
Review Papers, 89 J. NAT’L CANCER INST., 6-7 (1997); Rosalind A. Breslow, 
Sharon A. Ross & Douglas L. Weed, Quality of Reviews in Epidemiology, 88 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 475 (1998). 
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to say that the current practice of causal inference is, at best in 
trouble, and at worst in shambles.12 
IV.  ALL PROGRESS IS PRECARIOUS, AND THE SOLUTION OF ONE 
PROBLEM BRINGS US FACE TO FACE WITH ANOTHER PROBLEM—
MARTIN LUTHER KING 
Given the current situation, what is most impressive about 
epidemiology’s role in the identification of potentially preventable 
causes of illness and injury is that so much scientific and public 
health progress has been made. Smoking is indeed a cause of lung 
cancer, laryngea cancer, esophageal cancer, and bladder cancer. 
Human Papillomavirus does cause cervical cancer and HIV causes 
AIDS. The list of chemical carcinogens—asbestos, arsenic, aniline 
dyes, diethylstilbestrol, and cadmium to cite a few examples—is 
long. Radiation of many types is responsible for—causes skin 
cancer, breast cancer, and other diseases. Put another way, I do not 
want to give the reader of this brief paper the impression that the 
methods of causal inference are irremediable. But serious problems 
we do have. 
What is to be done? Two approaches for improving the 
situation can be identified: one empirical, the other theoretical. 
A. An Empirical Approach to Improving the Current Practice 
of Causal Inference 
There are examples—call them “case studies”—of causal 
associations in the historical record (i.e., the peer-reviewed 
scientific literature) about which we can all agree on the outcome. 
For each, we can describe the evidence—the studies and their 
evidentiary characteristics—that existed at the time a causal claim 
was first made or, alternatively, at the time a consensus about 
causation was reached. 
Smoking and cancer represents an excellent example. In 1964, 
a committee of scientists organized by the Surgeon General of the 
                                                          
12 Douglas L. Weed, Underdetermination and Incommensurability in 
Contemporary Epidemiology, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 107 (1997). 
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United States carefully collected, summarized, and examined the 
evidence (in a manner remarkably more systematic than much of 
what is published today in 2003!).13 They concluded that lung 
cancer and laryngeal cancer were caused by smoking cigarettes. 
Esophageal cancer and bladder cancer, however, were spared this 
conclusion. In 1982, after eighteen years of additional research, a 
new committee was formed, again under the auspices of the U.S. 
Surgeon General. The same causal criteria from 1964 were applied 
to a new (expanded) body of evidence with somewhat different 
evidentiary characteristics. In the judgment of the committee, 
esophageal cancer joined the ranks of those caused by smoking.14 
How can this type of analysis assist us in improving the 
practice of causal inference? Here’s just one example: Careful 
study of the 1964 decision on esophageal cancer will allow us to 
describe what evidence—as reflected in the causal criteria and 
their rules of inference—was insufficient to make a causal claim. 
Careful study of the 1982 decision on esophageal cancer (in which 
the committee changed its mind about causation) will provide an 
estimate of the cumulative amount and minimum characteristics of 
evidence required to make a causal claim (for that committee). 
In any such example of what we now consider to be a case of 
“known” causation, the extent to which the observed level of 
evidence—the kinds and characteristics of evidence—is 
representative of other causal associations is a fair question. 
Perhaps it would have been reasonable to claim causation with less 
(perhaps much less) evidence. Nevertheless, such an approach can 
provide empirical examples of the minimum level of evidence for 
causation aligned with a particular exposure-disease causal 
combination. 
B.  A Theoretical Approach to Improving the Practice of 
Causal Inference 
Alternatively, we may approach the research problem by 
                                                          
13 1964 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 6. 
14 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. NO. 82-50179, THE 
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER (1982). 
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examining the causal criteria, their rules of inference, and their 
prioritization of the criteria, in terms of connections to causal 
definitions, hypotheses, and theories. Simply put, for a given 
causal hypothesis or definition, what evidentiary conditions would 
be expected? Very little work has been done on this question in 
epidemiology. 
On the other hand, setting out causal conditions based on what 
we believe to be reasonable assumptions is a time-honored 
approach in epidemiology and can be traced to the early discussion 
of this topic in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Hill’s 1965 classic 
paper is an excellent example of this approach.15 Each criterion is 
considered separately. For example, the reasoning for consistency 
goes like this: a causal association should be observed in different 
study populations, using different methods, examined by different 
investigators; it would be consistent, in other words. Here’s 
another example: a causal association is a plausible association; to 
put it another way, if a purported relationship goes against what we 
know is biologically possible, then we would be less inclined to 
call it causal. Similarly, a cause must precede its effect in time, the 
essence of temporality. This approach is extremely popular in 
epidemiology. Nearly everyone has their opinion on how the 
criteria should be used. And these opinions are reflected in the high 
level of subjectivity or personal preference discussed earlier in this 
paper. 
Greater objectivity can be achieved if the criteria can be linked 
with general causal hypotheses (or general theories of causation or 
causal definitions).16 Currently, we have several definitions of 
causation to work with.17 Finally, the theoretical approach can be 
linked with the case-based empirical approach described above. 
Together, these two approaches are our best hope for progress in 
this difficult yet critical arena. 
V.   MORNING COMES WHETHER YOU SET THE ALARM OR NOT—
                                                          
15 Hill, supra note 5, at 295-300. 
16 Weed, Methods in Epidemiology, supra note 9, at 104-10. 
17 Mark Parascandola & Douglas L. Weed, Causation in Epidemiology, 55 
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 905 (2001). 
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URSULA K. LEGUIN 
In the end, my comments on general causation have been as 
much about the fuzzy future as they are about the dizzy present or 
the hazy past. 
Epidemiologists have only recently recognized that their 
practice of causal inference is seriously ill. For nearly fifty years, 
ever since the so-called chronic diseases—cancer, heart disease, 
diabetes, and mental illness emerged as foci for “modern” 
epidemiology—we have (almost systematically) ignored how we 
might improve the practice of causal inference. A few recent 
studies have shown that this practice, after years of neglect, suffers 
from a variety of ailments not uncommon for methods more 
qualitative than quantitative, yet which aspire to provide more-
certain-than-not results. 
The methods of causal inference are often used uncritically and 
are subject to unacceptable levels of subjectivity. Their results—
the causal claims and preventive recommendations—are 
susceptible to the whims of personal preference, what philosophers 
call “values.” Precisely opposite claims have emerged from 
investigators using the same causal criteria on the same evidence. 
It is no exaggeration to say that any epidemiologist who claims 
he is an expert—that he can reliably make claims about 
causation—is either hopelessly naïve or a flagrant prevaricator. As 
noted earlier, I do not mean to suggest that prior claims about what 
factors or exposures cause illnesses are incorrect. We—the public 
health community—have made the right call in many situations. 
What I am suggesting, on the other hand, is that we have failed to 
use the past record of achievement in general causation to the 
public’s advantage. Couple our reluctance to look back and gain 
from our experience—our successes and failures—with our well-
known aversion to theoretical development, and it is not surprising 
that we have made so little progress on a problem so central to our 
discipline. 
What is needed for causation in epidemiology—and the cliché 
is unintended—is more research. Two approaches have been 
described: one, like both legal and moral reasoning, emerges from 
careful empirical study of recorded case studies; the second is a 
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theoretical approach both more speculative and potentially more 
generalizable. 
The future comes to everyone at the same pace: sixty minutes 
per hour. To best meet that future for the problems of general 
causation, we must have the power to shape it through research and 
its application, what epidemiologists do best. 
 
